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abstract
Thecriticalattributesofepisodicmemoryareself,autonoeticconsciousnessandsubjectivelysensedtime.
The aim of this paper is to present a theoretical overview of our already published researches into the
nature of episodic memory over the course of time. We have developed a new method of assessing auto-
biographical memory (TEMPau task), which is specially designed to measure these speciﬁc aspects, based
on the sense of re-experiencing events from across the entire lifespan. Based on our ﬁndings of cognitive,
neuropsychologicalandneuroimagingstudies,newinsightsintoepisodicautobiographicalmemoriesare
presented, focusing on the effects of age of the subjects interacting with time interval in healthy subjects
and lesioned patients. The multifaceted and complex nature of episodic memory is emphasized and it
is suggested that mental time travel through subjective time, which allows individuals to re-experience
speciﬁc past events through a feeling of self-awareness, is the last feature of autobiographical memory
to become fully operational in development and the ﬁrst feature to go in aging and most amnesias. Our
ﬁndings highlight the critical role of frontotemporal areas in constructive autobiographical memory pro-
cesses, and especially hippocampus, in re-experiencing episodic details from the recent or more distant
past.
© 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
“Yesterday evening, as I was taking a solitary walk ...;Iw a s
roused from my thoughts by the warbling of a thrush perched
on the uppermost branch of a birch. At that very instant, its
magic notes conjured up images of the family estate ... sud-
denlytransportedbackintothepast,Igazedoncemoreuponthe
countryside where I had so often heard the thrush’s song. When
I listened to it then, I was as sad as I am now.” (Chateaubriand,
Mémoire d’outre tombe [Memoirs from beyond the tomb], 1848)
1. The concept of lifelong episodic autobiographical
memory
In previous centuries, philosophers and psychologists regarded
memory as a power of the mind responsible for our self-identity
(e.g. James, 1890; Locke, 1690). It was a unique property, as illus-
trated by Théodule Ribot (1881): “I have made the journey from
Paris to Brest a hundred times. All these images overlap to form
an unclear mass—a single, vague state, if the truth be told. Of all
these journeys, only those connected to some important event, be
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it happy or unfortunate, appear to me as memories: only those that
arouse secondary states of consciousness are situated in time.” In
the same vein, James (1890) emphasized that “memory requires
more than mere dating of a fact in the past. It must be dated
in my past. In other words, I must think that I directly experi-
enced its occurrence. It must have that “warmth and intimacy”
...as characterizing all experiences “appropriated” by the thinker
as his own” (volume I, p. 650). This view closely parallels current
conceptions of episodic memory, placing an emphasis on the sub-
jective recollective experience and on pastness. The ambition of
this paper is to present a theoretical overview into the multifaceted
and complex nature of episodic memory emphasizing its temporal
complexity, i.e. changes with the age of subjects, interacting with
the age of memories, based on our already published researches in
terms of cognitive, neuropsychological, and functional neuroimag-
ing approaches.
According to its most recent deﬁnition, episodic memory refers
to personal events recollected in the context of a particular time
and place – the “what”, “where” and “when” – and with some ref-
erence to oneself as a participant in the episode (Tulving, 1985,
2001, 2002). With the development of the theory of episodic mem-
ory, the essence of this memory system has shifted away from
speciﬁcity and towards the phenomenal experience of remember-
ing (Brewer, 1996; Baddeley, 2001; Gardiner, 2001; Tulving, 2001,
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2002;Wheeler,Stuss,&Tulving,1997).Assuch,itencompassesper-
ceptual, affective and spatiotemporal contextual details, and gives
the rememberer the feeling that a representation is the recollec-
tion of an event belonging to his or her personal past. Although
this memory system contrasts with semantic memory, its opera-
tionsrelyon,butgobeyond,thesemanticmemorysystem.Episodic
and semantic memory systems are associated with two distinct
statesofconsciousness:autonoeticandnoeticconsciousness.Auto-
noetic consciousness, which is a sine qua non of episodic memory,
is deﬁned by a sense of self in time and the mental reliving of sub-
jectiveexperiencesarisingfromtheencodingcontext.Hence,based
onacombinationofself,autonoeticconsciousnessandsubjectively
sensed time, episodic memory makes it possible to travel mentally
through subjective time, from present to past, and thus to recol-
lect, one’s own previous experiences via autonoetic consciousness.
The central tenet of this theory therefore revolves around phe-
nomenological re-experiencing and the sense of self in time. The
neural bases of episodic memory and autonoetic consciousness are
thought to be subserved primarily by the prefrontal cortex, but also
bythemedialtemporallobe(Tulving&Markowitsch,1998;Vargha-
Khadem et al., 1997). By contrast, semantic memory is associated
with noetic consciousness, which denotes the subject’s ability to
be aware of information about the world in the absence of any
remembering, and is subserved by a broad set of neocortical areas
(including frontal, temporal and occipital cortices).
As episodic memory refers to events recollected in the context
of a particular time and place, and with a degree of autobio-
graphical reference, autobiographical memory (AM) has long been
regarded as being episodic in nature. Moreover, autobiographi-
cal memory gives researchers the opportunity to study episodic
memory using self-relevant material that is more closely related
to the current deﬁnition of episodic memory (Tulving, 2001, 2002)
than that used in most standard tests of episodic memory (Piolino,
2008). The latter rarely make a distinction between the differ-
ent components (content and context) of episodic memory and
do not measure very lengthy retention intervals, autobiographical
references or rich phenomenological and idiosyncratic aspects of
memory. Interestingly, the assessment of autobiographical mem-
ory makes it possible to investigate not only the ability to recall
a speciﬁc and meaningful personal event, locating it in time and
space, but also the ability to travel back into the past and relive
speciﬁc details of that event which distinguish it from any sim-
ilar ones. However, as has so often happened in the history of
memory conceptions (Baddeley, 2001; Scoville & Milner, 1957),
neuropsychological examinations of patients have proved to be
an additional source of evidence. Drawing on their pioneering
study of the amnesic patient KC, Tulving, Schacter, McLachlan and
Moscovitch (Tulving, Schacter, McLachlan, & Moscovitch, 1988; see
Rosenbaum et al., 2005, for a review) were among the ﬁrst to pro-
pose a clear distinction between the episodic component of AM
(disturbed in KC), containing personal speciﬁc events situated in
time and space, and a semantic component (preserved in KC), stor-
ing general knowledge about one’s past, such as the names of
acquaintances, personal addresses, generic events and self-concept
(Tulving, 1993). This study provided evidence that people can gain
mental access to their personal past not only through autonoetic
remembering but also through just knowing. Accordingly, seman-
tic memory includes not only general information about the world,
butalsoknowledgeaboutpreviouspersonaleventsandexperiences
that one can no longer remember. More recently, Conway, Singer,
and Tagini (2004) claimed that the retrieval of autobiographical
memories depends on a complex, self-driven set of control pro-
cesses and involves the episodic memory system, which contains
event-speciﬁc sensory–perceptual–cognitive–affective details, and
the long-term semantic self, which contains more abstract
autobiographical knowledge (i.e. generic events and conceptual
knowledge). Therefore, autobiographical memory is now rec-
ognized as being multifaceted, containing a body of general
knowledge, as well as unique experiences speciﬁc to an individual,
which have been accumulated since childhood, and which allow
him/her to construct a feeling of identity and continuity (Conway
& Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Piolino, Desgranges, & Eustache, 2000;
Wilson & Ross, 2003). When it comes to the relationship between
self and memory, Tulving’s conception emphasizes the episodic
aspects of the self, defending the role of a phenomenological self in
the construction and maintenance of subjective continuity in time
and personal identity.
The episodic component of AM contains speciﬁc personal
events, with phenomenological details situated in time and space
pertaining to one’s self, and presupposes very lengthy retention
intervals. Its essence lies in the autonoetic state of consciousness,
which enables a personal event to be consciously recollected in its
original encoding context and implies mental time travel. Episodic
AMs have several core characteristics: they not only concern
unique,personaleventssituatedintimeandspace,butalsopresup-
pose phenomenological details (i.e. perceptual, cognitive, affective
internal contextual details), self-relevance, the conscious recollec-
tion of these events and the rememberer’s personal perspective
(Brewer, 1996). Visual mental imagery and emotional experi-
ence are critical phenomenological characteristics of episodic AM
retrieval. Hence, the subjective sense of remembering almost
invariably involves some sort of visual (Greenberg & Rubin, 2003)
and emotional (Rubin & Berntsen, 2003) re-experiencing of an
event. Unlike episodic AM, the semantic component of AM is char-
acterizedbyanoeticstateofconsciousness,inwhichoneiscapable
of retrieving general facts about personal events, but not of reex-
periencing speciﬁc contexts. Therefore, not all memories that are
autobiographical have an autonoetic character mediated by the
episodic memory system.
One of the most interesting current debates about episodic
memory revolves around whether and how memories change over
time. One of the merits of AM studies is that they have painted
a much more dynamic picture of memory consolidation, storage
and retrieval than strictly “experimental” studies, i.e. those in the
Ebbinghaus tradition. There is a strong body of evidence that,
rather than being only determined by the length of the retention
interval, the distribution of episodic AMs across a long lifespan
reﬂects the survival of vivid memories from late adolescence and
early adulthood compared with other remote periods – the so-
called reminiscence bump (Rubin, Wetzler, & Nebes, 1986; Rubin &
Schulkind, 1997; Rubin, Rahhal, & Poon, 1998) – which represents
a potent landmark for the current self (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce,
2000), serving to maintain a sense of identity and continuity in the
present.Furthermore,withthepassageoftimeandtherepetitionof
similar events in the phenomenal experience of remembering real-
world events, there is a shift away from autonoetic consciousness
and towards noetic consciousness, i.e. from episodic to seman-
tic memory (Conway, Gardiner, Perfect, Anderson, & Cohen, 1997;
Robinson & Swanson, 1993). This shift is in line with the idea
that most features of very long-term memories become semanti-
cized over time (Cermak, 1984), becoming a mixture of semantic
knowledge and speciﬁc experiences (see also Piolino, Lamidey,
Desgranges, & Eustache, 2007; Westmacott & Moscovitch, 2003 for
an illustration of this concept in the recollection of names of con-
temporary celebrities). The nature of AM retrieval and conscious
experience depends on the ratio of episodic to semantic elements
(see Cabeza & St Jacques, 2007, for a similar view). It has been pos-
tulated that the loss of episodic details and the emergence of a
conceptual organization cause a “Remember-to-Know” shift over
time, as a result of repeated encounters with similar events. It is
worth noting that repetition has been shown to inﬂuence autobio-
graphical recollection, whether it be “internal” repetition (thinking2316 P. Piolino et al. / Neuropsychologia 47 (2009) 2314–2329
or talking about the same event) or “external” repetition (living
through similar events). While external repetition can lead to the
decontextualisation or semantization of events, internal repetition
canreinforcethepersistenceofphenomenologicaldetailsovertime
(Nadel, Campbell, & Ryan, 2007; Rubin & Kozin, 1984).
The nature of AM across lifetime periods is a critical aspect
of the lively argument about the neural substrates of long-term
memory consolidation. Despite numerous neuropsychological and
functionalneuroimagingstudies,theneurobiologicalbasesoflong-
term episodic memory consolidation are still subject to debate
(Bright et al., 2006; Mc Gaugh, 2000; M e e t e r&M u r r e ,2 00 4 ). There
are two main opposing theories regarding the involvement of the
medial temporal lobe (MTL) in long-term memory consolidation.
According to the Standard Theory (Bayley, Gold, Hopkins, & Squire,
2005; Squire & Alvarez, 1995), the MTL is involved in the storage
and retrieval of declarative memory (either semantic or episodic)
for a limited period of a few years. Direct connections have been
established between this model and the theory of episodic mem-
ory semanticization (see above, e.g. Eustache et al., 2004). The
main arguments of the Standard Theory are based on evidence
from neuropsychological studies showing diverse proﬁles of ret-
rograde amnesia depending on the locus of the lesion. In amnesic
syndromes where the lesions are concentrated in the MTL or con-
nectedregions,thepatternofretrogradeamnesiaisconsistentwith
the Standard Theory and obeys Ribot’s Law (Ribot, 1881), with old
memories being better preserved than recent ones. The alterna-
tive Multiple Trace Theory considers that while the standard view
is valid for semantic information and semanticized memories over
time, it is not for lifelong episodic memories (Moscovitch et al.,
2005; Nadel & Moscovitch, 1997; Nadel, Campbell, et al., 2007).
Rather, the MTL continues to perform its task of recollecting the
myriad attributes (time, place, emotional content and perceptual
features) of episodic memories no matter how old they are.
Thus, given the multifaceted nature of AM, it is vital to have
stringent methods of investigation, especially in order to assess the
existenceofepisodicAMacrossdifferenttimeperiods,checkingnot
onlytheabilitytorepresentaspeciﬁceventandlocateitintimeand
space, but also the ability to recollect speciﬁc features of that event
via autonoetic consciousness (Moscovitch et al., 2005). In order to
investigate the complexity of episodic AM over the course of time
andtotestthetwoconﬂictingmodelsoflong-termmemoryconsol-
idation with respect to the MTL’s role in episodic memory retrieval,
we carried out a series of cognitive, neuropsychological and neu-
roimagingstudies,usinganewtoolthathasbeenspeciallydesigned
to measure the multifaceted episodic features of autobiographical
memories and the sense of recollection.
2. A new episodic autobiographical memory assessment
based on a subjective sense of recollection: the TEMPau task
Since Crovitz and Schiffmann’s ground-breaking study (1974),
the introduction of more ﬁne-grained conceptions of AM has con-
siderably improved the way we measure the various contents
of AM. However, far too few of the AM assessment tasks cur-
rently used in neuropsychology apply a deﬁnition of episodic AM
based on recollective experience, in accordance with Tulving’s cur-
rent theories. Aside from techniques based on the Galton–Crovitz
cue-word paradigm, standardised semi-structured interviews have
beendevelopedtoexamineAMsfromdifferentlifetimeperiods(e.g.
Borrini, Dall’Ora, Della Sala, Marinelli, & Spinnler, 1989; Ivaniou,
Cooper, Shanks, & Venneri, 2006; Kopelman, Wilson, & Baddeley,
1989). The scoring for autobiographical incidents revolves around
the speciﬁcity of the event recalled in time and place, and the rich-
nessofthedescription.Thiskindofscoringadherestothedeﬁnition
of episodic memory based on its “what,” “where” and “when” con-
tents, but ignores the notion of mentally travelling back in time to
relive elements of the original experience. Thus, other decisive fac-
tors are generally needed to capture the “true” episodic attributes
of AM. Some researchers have attempted to unravel the subcom-
ponents of AM, as deﬁned by Tulving, according to the number of
contextual details. They claim that in addition to the speciﬁcity of
the recollection, it is the number of contextual details that makes
AM “truly episodic in the sense that one can literally re-experience
it” (Moscovitch, Yaschyshyn, Ziegler, & Nadel, 1999; p. 338). In
the same vein, Levine, Svoboda, Hay, Winocur, and Moscovitch
(2002) proposed investigating recollections from ﬁve different life-
time periods, separating the episodic from the non-episodic details
(repeated or factual details, metacognitive statements, etc.) by
means of a scoring procedure adapted from the Memory Charac-
teristics Questionnaire created by Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye
(1988), which lists the qualitative characteristics (e.g. perceptual,
spatiotemporal, and emotional) of details about personal events.
Particular attention is given to internal episodic details that are
regarded as reﬂecting autonoetic experience of the original event.
Interestingly, this procedure allows the ﬁne-grained consideration
ofbothepisodicandsemanticfeatures,evenwhenspeciﬁcautobio-
graphical events are being recalled. However, it does not rely on the
speciﬁc mode of subjective experience accompanying the retrieval
of memory in the form of a ﬁrst-person approach (Gardiner, 2001).
This other way of distinguishing episodic re-experiencing from
semantic familiarity has received relatively little attention in the
AM literature, despite the fact that Tulving’s conception of episodic
memory is inextricably bound up with the subjective phenomeno-
logical recollective experience.
It was to remedy this that we designed an original test,
known as the TEMPau task (Test Episodique de Mémoire du Passé
autobiographique, Piolino et al., 2000; for more details, Piolino,
Desgranges, Belliard, et al., 2003; Piolino et al., 2006), specif-
ically to assess episodic AM, taking into account not only the
speciﬁcity of the personal events that are recalled (uniqueness,
spatiotemporal location, details), but also the subjective experi-
ence of remembering the encoding context. Episodic AM relies
not only on the ability to recall a speciﬁc event and locate it
in time and space, but also on the ability to recollect speciﬁc
details which distinguish that event from similar ones. As it is
possible to rebuild a speciﬁc event from one’s personal semantic
AM without actually reliving sensory–perceptual episodic details,
it is vital to gauge the speciﬁcity of details from the encoding
context through the sense of re-experiencing. The encoding con-
text encompasses time and space (i.e. the speciﬁcity of event),
sensory–perceptual–affective–cognitive details (i.e. the speciﬁcity
ofdetails),thesubjectiveexperience(i.e.autonoeticconsciousness)
and the visual experience (i.e. self-perspective) (see Table 1).
Based on existing semi-structured questionnaires (Borrini et
al., 1989; Kopelman et al., 1989; Piolino, Desgranges, Benali,
& Eustache, 2002), the TEMPau’s originality lies in the way it
addresses the issue of the state of consciousness and the self-
perspective accompanying memory retrieval across the entire
lifespan, by incorporating two kinds of subjective measures of
episodicre-experiencing(seeFig.1).Participantsareﬁrstgivenpre-
cise instructions to recall personal events from ﬁve different time
periods which occurred only once, at a particular place and date,
and lasted several minutes or hours but never more than a day. The
subjectivereportsofmemoriesarethenassessedusingtheRemem-
ber/Know procedure (Gardiner, 1988; Tulving, 1985), which makes
it possible to differentiate between episodic and semantic memory
retrieval, i.e. autonoetic consciousness from noetic consciousness.
An alternative response (“Guess”) is added in order to ensure that
the Know responses do not contain any degree of uncertainty,
compared with the Remember responses (Gardiner, Ramponi, &
Richardson-Klavehn, 1998). This Remember/Know/Guess proce-
dure, originally used in the context of laboratory learning materialP. Piolino et al. / Neuropsychologia 47 (2009) 2314–2329 2317
Table 1
Operational criteria for assessment of episodic autobiographical memory.
Experimenter assessment of content
Speciﬁcity of event Uniqueness
Short duration (less than 24h)
Spatial situation
Temporal situation
Speciﬁcity of details Factual*
Spatiotemporal**
Phenomenological***
Self-assessment of retrieval mode
Point of view (Field/Observer) Field
State of consciousness (Remember/Know) Autonoetic
Quality of memories Vividness and number of visual mental images
Intensity and emotional valence
Frequency of rehearsal
Speciﬁc details that only belong to one particular event.
* What, who, causes, circumstances.
** Situation and sequence.
*** Perception, thinking, emotion.
such as wordlists, can be usefully applied to AM retrieval in con-
ditions which tap more complex self-relevant information and the
long retention intervals inherent to real life. However, even today,
the Remember/Know procedure is seldom used to assess the state
of consciousness accompanying remote memories (e.g. Rybash &
Monaghan, 1999). Given that one feature of episodic memory is the
pulling together into a single episode of what, where, and when
something happened, the TEMPau test is designed to probe the dif-
ferent aspects of recollective experience, in particular the factual,
spatial and temporal features of memories. Thereafter, a proce-
dure is used to check whether the R responses are infused with
the idiosyncratic perspectives, emotions and thoughts of the per-
son doing the remembering. This procedure has previously been
carried out in laboratory studies in order to conﬁrm that par-
ticipants are obeying instructions when they give R responses
(see Gardiner, 2001). Besides autonoetic consciousness, the assess-
mentoftherememberer’sself-perspectiveduringautobiographical
recollection can be based on the viewpoint associated with the
Fig. 1. General organization of the TEMPau task (from Piolino et al., 2006). Description of the Test Episodique de Mémoire du Passé autobiographique (TEMPau) and recorded
scores. Method: The participants are asked to recall four speciﬁc autobiographical memories (or eight for the most recent time period) which have some relevance to their
personal lives, from ﬁve periods covering their entire lifespan (i.e. 0–17 years old (or childhood and adolescence), 18–30 years old (or young adulthood), more than 30 years
old except for the last 5 years (or older adulthood), the last 5 years except for the last 12 months (or relatively recent), the last 12 months (or very recent)). After recall,
spontaneous or otherwise, the participants are prompted up to three times to give more details if necessary and/or to be more speciﬁc if they have recalled a generic event.
After the recall of each event, whatever its level of speciﬁcity, the participants are required to report their self-perspective and state of consciousness during retrieval, before
the next cue is given (see Field/Observer and Remember/Know). In a ﬁeld perspective, the participants keep the same viewpoint that they had in the original event, whereas
in an observer perspective, the participants see themselves in the event from the viewpoint of an external observer. During the state of consciousness task, separate responses
have to be given for the factual (what), spatial (where) and temporal (when) contents of memories. First, they select an Remember response if they can remember the speciﬁc
episode with its encoding context—in which case, they may virtually relive the previous event (e.g. details such as thoughts, feelings or images related to the recalled event),
a Know response if they just know this episode took place but cannot recall any speciﬁc event and cannot virtually relive any sensory or affective details pertaining to the
recalled event, or a Guess response if they just guess that they probably experienced this episode but neither remember nor know it. Thereafter, a procedure is used to check
each Remember response in terms of details (justiﬁed Remember). Scoring: Each event is scored on a 5-point episodic scale which takes into account the speciﬁcity of the
content (i.e. single or repeated event), the spatiotemporal situation, and more especially the presence of internal details (i.e. perceptions, thoughts, feelings). Two main total
scores are recorded per lifetime period examined: (a) an overall score called the AM score, which includes all the memories (both speciﬁc and generic) and corresponds to
the classic episodic memory score used in the Autobiographical Memory Interview (Kopelman et al., 1989) and (b) an episodic score, called the EM score which only includes
speciﬁc and detailed memories scoring 4. A spontaneity score is recorded on a 5-point scale that conversely takes into account the number of cues and/or prompts the
participant needed in order to recall a speciﬁc event instead of a generic one. The Field/Observer and Remember/Know paradigms and the justiﬁed Remember procedure
make it possible to record several further scores per period, i.e. the percentage of each type of response.2318 P. Piolino et al. / Neuropsychologia 47 (2009) 2314–2329
mental representations, known as the Field/Observer perspective
paradigm (Nigro & Neisser, 1983; Robinson & Swanson, 1993). In
total, episodic AM can be characterized as enabling someone to
“travel back in time” relive speciﬁc events and view these events
as they would originally have been seen through his or her own
eyes (see also Crawley & French, 2005).
According to Tulving’s ideas, justiﬁed Remember scores can be
regardedascomingclosesttothenotionofepisodicre-experiencing
via autonoetic consciousness. Details in this case are deemed to
be episodic because they have been re-experienced. The TEMPau
task therefore proposes a stringent approach to testing episodic
AM retrieval across lifetime periods, based mainly on autonoetic
consciousness and self-in-time. The idea here is to consider how
participants recall matters just as much as what they recall (see
also Brewer, 1996; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Wilson & Ross,
2003).
3. New insights from the TEMPau task
3.1. Effects of age and time interval on episodic autobiographical
memory
Studies of AM across the lifespan have to deal with other fac-
tors that are intrinsically related to very long-term intervals, such
as the effects of age at encoding and age at retrieval, which can
blur the analyses of the effect of time interval per se. These factors
can be explored using assessment methods that make it possible to
evaluate the semantic and episodic components of autobiographi-
cal memory in subjects of different ages, by deﬁning time intervals
so that retrieval can be studied with a ﬁxed time interval what-
ever the subject’s age. Hence, if the boundaries of each time period
under consideration are deﬁned according to the subject’s age, it
then becomes possible to differentiate between the effects of age,
retention interval and age at encoding. Accordingly, like Levine et
al. (2002), Piolino et al. (2002) used a semi-structured question-
naire (the precursor of the TEMPau task) to check that episodic
recall (i.e. speciﬁc and detailed memories) does indeed deterio-
rate with age and retention interval, whereas semantic recall (i.e.
general personal knowledge, such as the names of acquaintances,
addresses, jobs, etc.) is characterized by relative invariance. As far
as episodic memories are concerned, Piolino et al. (2002) observed
(1) the classic temporal distribution of memories (Rubin et al.,
1986; Rubin & Schulkind, 1997) characterized by a retention func-
tion covering a period of a few years and a clear recency effect,
together with (2) the existence of a signiﬁcant reminiscence bump
in subjects of at least 50 years of age and (3) a period of childhood
amnesia. In this study, the average encoding ages for the remi-
niscence bump and childhood amnesia corresponded to 23 and
4 years respectively. The deleterious effects of age concerned the
retention function and the reminiscence bump, but not the period
of infantile amnesia. Further ﬁndings have been obtained more
recently using the TEMPau task. First, we demonstrated age effects
across all ﬁve lifetime periods on the speciﬁcity of event recall and
spontaneity of retrieval, as well as on the phenomenal experience
of remembering—i.e. self-perspective and the state of conscious-
ness (Piolino et al., 2006). While the ﬁeld perspective and sense
of remembering declined with age and remoteness, the sense of
just knowing and the observer perspective increased with age and
remoteness.Theseeffectsconcernedthefactual,spatialandtempo-
ralattributesofmemories.Theseﬁndingsthereforesuggestthatthe
ability to consciously recollect many speciﬁc events and relive the
contextinwhichtheyoccurreddeteriorateswithaging,inlinewith
theﬁndingsofclassiclaboratorytests(e.g.,Clarys,Isingrini,&Gana,
2002; Perfect & Dasgupta, 1997; Parkin & Walter, 1992). In older
adults, the temporal distribution of Field and Remember responses
(justiﬁed or otherwise) provided for the temporal content of AM
was characterized by a recency effect and by an increase in these
responses for distant memories from the 18–30 years old period
(i.e.thereminiscencebump).Overall,themainﬁndingshighlighted
the fact that aging and remoteness not only affect the speciﬁcity of
details, but also autonoetic consciousness and the self-perspective.
TheevidenceofcontrastingtemporalproﬁlesfortheField/Observer
responses,mirroringtheresultfortheRemember/Knowresponses,
supportstheviewthatthereisashiftinthephenomenalexperience
of remembering real-world events with the passage of time that
causes a “Remember-to-Know” and “Field-to-Observer” shift over
time (Cermak, 1984; Conway et al., 1997; Linton, 1986). The great-
est “Remember-to-Know” shift concerns the temporal attributes
of AMs. However, although episodic AMs decrease with age and
remoteness, some of them resist because there are self-relevant
(e.g. self-deﬁning memories, Conway et al., 2004) and therefore
continue to retain the same main features as before, regardless of
the person’s age (i.e., mental reliving of affective and perceptual
details,accessibility,andself-perspectives).Interestingly,wefound
that age had a gradual effect on the ability to justify Remember
responsesbyrecallingspeciﬁcdetails,whatevertheperiodandirre-
spective of the content, although this ability was better preserved
for remote time periods than for more recent ones. Therefore, sub-
jective episodic re-experiencing in the form of travelling back in
time to relive personal events is more objectively preserved in the
most distant past than in the recent past, which may explain why
elderly subjects often think their remote memories are better pre-
served than more recent ones.
Continuing on the theme of the superimposition of subjects’
age and the age of their memories, the effect of age at encoding
on the recall of the most remote period of life covering the child-
hood and early adolescence has been further explored using an
adaptation of the TEMPau task aimed at school-age children aged
from 6 to 13 years (Piolino, Hisland, Matuszewski, Jambaqué, &
Eustache, 2007). This study highlighted age-related differences in
episodic AM, whereas personal semantic memory (based on gen-
eral knowledge, such as the names of familiar people or heroes,
personal and school addresses, and lessons at school) was charac-
terizedbyrelativedevelopmentalinvariance.Thisproﬁleparalleled
the developmental dissociation revealed by the Remember/Know
paradigm, i.e. autonoetic/noetic consciousness. Increasing age was
particularly important in the spontaneity of recall and number of
“Remember”responsesandtheirjustiﬁcationintermsoftheactual
contextual details that were retrieved—factual, spatial and, more
especially, temporal details. These ﬁndings support the view that
mental time travel through subjective time, which allows one to
re-experience the past through self-awareness, is one of the last
features of autobiographical memory to become fully operational.
This is in keeping with Tulving’s theory (1985, 2001, 2002) that
episodic memory develops later in ontogeny than semantic mem-
ory. This assumption has been considered in light of the theory of
infantile amnesia originally deﬁned by Freud (1905). According to
this, adults are unable to subjectively re-experience the circum-
stances of early personal events encoded before the age of 5, not
because of a problem of retrieval, but because of the absence of
truly episodic memory before that age (Wheeler et al., 1997; see
also Nelson & Fivush, 2004).
Research carried out more recently in our laboratory has high-
lighted the role of executive functions in the generative retrieval
mechanisms involved in the emergence or impairment of episodic
AM retrieval in children or older adults (Piolino, Desgranges, &
Eustache, 2008). Moreover, different factors other than age and
remoteness, such as emotion and images of the self, are impor-
tant to study as they are indeed also crucial to AM retrieval in
healthy subjects (Libby & Eibach, 2002; Talarico, Labar, & Rubin,
2004) as in patients (see Conway et al., 2004; Guillery et al., 2000;
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ﬁrmed in patients with depression a diminution in episodic AMs
(i.e. speciﬁcity of details, autonoetic consciousness and ﬁeld self-
perspective) compared to healthy controls, all the more concerning
positive events (Lemogne et al., 2006), we observed in healthy
young adults a relationship between a diminution in episodic AMs
(i.e. speciﬁcity of details, autonoetic consciousness and ﬁeld self-
perspective), and the cognitive avoidance of intrusive emotional
recollections (Lemogne et al., 2009).
3.2. Neural substrates of the re-experiencing of episodic
autobiographical memory over time in normal subjects
We have discovered that some relevant episodic AM persist
regardless of the time periods being considered, even in older
adults. We investigated the neural substrates of these episodic
AMs by adopting two complementary approaches, namely activa-
tion studies in normal adults and correlational studies between the
TEMPau task and resting-state neuroimaging measures.
Yetagreatmanyfunctionalneuroimagingstudieshaveexplored
theactivationtriggeredbyAMtasksinhealthysubjects(forreviews,
seeCabeza&StJacques,2007;Conway,Pleydell-Pearce,Whitecross,
& Sharpe, 2002; Maguire, 2001; Svoboda, McKinnon, & Levine,
2006). They have found evidence of a large network encompass-
ing the prefrontal, medial and lateral temporal cortices, as well
as posterior regions, but yielded controversial results concerning
the relationship between the MTL structures and the length of
the retention interval. Some studies (e.g. Maguire & Frith, 2003a;
Niki & Luo, 2002; Piefke, Weiss, Zilles, Markowitsch, & Fink, 2003)
have reported differing degrees of engagement of the hippocam-
pal region in recent and remote AM retrieval, seemingly arguing
in favour of the standard model of memory consolidation. Others
have provided evidence that semantic memory retrieval involves
the MTL regardless of remoteness, which is problematic for the two
conﬂicting theories (Bernard et al., 2004). Most of the other studies
failedtoﬁndanydifferentialinvolvementoftheMTLasafunctionof
timeinterval(forreviews,seeCabeza&StJacques,2007;Svobodaet
al., 2006), thereby contradicting Standard Theory predictions and
supporting Multiple Trace Theory ones instead. In some of these
studies,methodologicalconfoundsmayhavebiasedcertainresults.
For instance, in most cases, a questionnaire was administered a few
weeksordayspriortothescanningsessioninordertoobtainmate-
rial for constructing the cues used during scanning to reactivate
old memory traces. Only a few studies tried to prevent subjects
from reencoding their memories via the hippocampus (e.g. Gilboa,
Winocur, Grady, Hevenor, & Moscovitch, 2004; Okuda et al., 2003).
In our set of studies, we designed speciﬁc protocols based on
the TEMPau paradigm in order to capture the neural correlates of
episodic AM recollection fulﬁlling ﬁve main principles: (1) avoid-
ingthereencodingofmemoriespriortothescan;(2)promotingthe
retrieval mode of episodic AM through re-experiencing; (3) prob-
ing different lifetime periods; (4) taking into account the dynamics
of AM retrieval; and (5) controlling for the episodic nature of mem-
ories that are retrieved and the qualities of recollection.
In an initial Positron Emission Tomography (PET) activation
study of young adults (Piolino et al., 2004), we examined the men-
tal retrieval of recent (last 12 months) and remote (5–10 years ago)
episodic AMs from sentence cues (e.g. a party with your friends
within the last year or a special party with your friends that took
place when you were between 17 and 20 years of age) controlling
for memory access time. The sentence cues were selected from a
previous experimental study of AM in healthy subjects on the basis
of their likelihood of producing speciﬁc detailed AMs in young sub-
jects with the same ease of access regardless of time interval. Prior
to scans, the subjects were trained to mentally relive episodic AMs
(different from the scanning) with as many episodic details as they
could, such as time, location, perceptions and feelings, when they
Fig. 2. The percentage of justiﬁed Remember responses (mean %) as a function of
age group in school-age children (top) and adults (bottom) for each lifetime period
(adapted from Piolino et al., 2006; Piolino, Hisland, Matuszewski, et al., 2007).
listened to the sentence cues. After the scans, they were asked to
retrieve these evocations again, but this time out loud. The nature
of the AMs they retrieved was assessed according to objective mea-
sures performed by the experimenters (i.e. speciﬁcity and details),
as well as to more subjective measures performed by the subjects
themselves, regarding the retrieval strategy they had used (verbal
orvisual),frequencyofrehearsal(fromnonetoveryfrequent),state
of consciousness (Knowing or Remembering), vividness of mental
visual imagery (from vague to very clear), self-perspective (Field
or Observer) and emotion (from none to very intense at encoding
or retrieval). The main ﬁnding was that the retrieval of both recent
and remote episodic AMs was characterized by speciﬁcity, auto-
noetic consciousness, visual imagery and emotion, and principally
activated a widespread left-sided network (i.e. left prefrontal, tem-
poralandparietal,anteriorcingulatecortex,leftfusiformgyrus,left
subcortical areas), plus the bilateral posterior cingulate cortex and
cerebellum and the bilateral hippocampus. Interestingly, the ﬁnd-
ings pointed to greater hippocampal activity for remote memories
than for recent ones and a predominantly right-sided hippocam-
pal involvement, whatever the remoteness of the autobiographical
memories. (Fig. 2).
The second study was designed to explore memories from
across the lifespan of older healthy subjects aged approximately
70 years (Viard et al., 2007) and therefore to conduct brain mea-
sures of AM recollection for very long retention intervals, lasting
decades. The ﬁve main principles were the same as before, but
we adopted another method of selecting sentence cues and used
functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) instead of PET. This
time, we asked husbands to describe speciﬁc relevant events from
their wives’ lives, covering the same ﬁve time periods as those
in the TEMPau task. We were thus able to identify the brain
structures involved in the recollection of episodic AMs across the
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Fig. 3. Images showing results of the small volume correction analysis centred on the hippocampus. Coronal planes indicate left hippocampal activation for P1 (0–17 years
old) and P5 (last 12 months) and bilateral hippocampal activation for P2 (18–30 years old), P3 (more than 30 years old), and P4 (last 5 years). Colour scale: voxel Z-score values
(from Viard et al., 2007).
ing a family member. The ﬁndings showed that the recollection
of episodic AMs from the ﬁve time periods triggered activation
within a circumscribed network, including the left hippocampus
and superior frontal gyrus, as well as the bilateral precuneus and
posterior cingulate gyrus. In addition, the period of the reminis-
cence bump showed speciﬁc activation in the left lateral temporal
lobe. Behavioural results indicated that, regardless of the age of
the memories, recollection was characterized by speciﬁcity (i.e.
spatiotemporal uniqueness and details), as well as by an auto-
noetic state of consciousness and mental visual imagery, attesting
to their episodic nature. However, remote memories from young
and older adulthood periods (18–30 years old and more than 30),
as well as from the last 5 years, were rated more strongly in terms
of phenomenological characteristics (emotional intensity, image
qualityorautonoeticconsciousness)thanthosefromboththemost
remote and most recent periods. These three time periods also
triggered the activation of the right hippocampus (Fig. 3). Regard-
less of the time periods, both anterior and posterior parts of the
hippocampus were activated (see Lepage, Habib, & Tulving, 1998;
for a discussion on the functional distinction between the anterior
and posterior hippocampus in terms of encoding and retrieval pro-
cesses). New analyses of connectivity between the hippocampus
and neocortex have highlighted signiﬁcant correlations between
the activation of the MTL and the activation of the neocortical
regions for both recent and remote periods, albeit to a lesser extent
for the most recent period (Viard et al., submitted). Interestingly,
the latter pattern of results highlighted a bilateral network con-
cerned with episodic AM retrieval. More specially, from the distant
past, bilateral hippocampal activation was predicted by other MTL
structures (parahippocampal gyrus and amygdala) and by the neo-
cortical regions (lateral temporal cortex and temporal pole).
As a follow-up to our PET activation study, we used
another powerful approach—the cognitive–metabolic correlative
technique—which requires both cognitive tests and resting-state
PETscanstobeconductedwithinashorttimeinterval(afewdaysat
most), and correlations to be performed between these two sets of
dataacrossagroupofsubjects.PETmakesitpossibletostudyphys-
iological parameters such as blood ﬂow or metabolism, which are
closely related to synaptic activity. It is a well-validated method for
mapping the functional neuroanatomy of a given behaviour in neu-
rodegenerative diseases (Desgranges et al., 1998; Desgranges et al.,
2002; Eustache, Desgranges, Giffard, de la Sayette, & Baron, 2001;
Rauchs et al., 2007; Teipel et al., 2006; see Salmon, Lekeu, Bastin,
Garraux, & Collette, 2008, for review). It is particularly useful for
establishing cognitive and neurobiological models of human mem-
ory, because it allows the mapping of cerebral networks subserving
a particular task and can be used to identify regions whose involve-
ment is crucial to the task (see Tulving, Habib, Nyberg, Lepage,
& McIntosh, 1999; for a discussion of the concepts of “how sites”
and “what sites”). More relevant to the present discussion, the cor-
relative method offers an alternative approach which overcomes
some of the methodological limitations to AM neuroimaging stud-
ies (e.g. no direct control over the nature of episodic AM activated
inside the scanner, the intrinsic difﬁculty of disentangling reencod-
ing processes from retrieval ones and recall of abstract semantic
knowledge from that of speciﬁc information) enabling the use of
sophisticated cognitive assessments where the nature of memories
can be strictly controlled.
The adoption of a cognitive–metabolic approach in order to
reveal the neural substrates of AM in healthy subjects was justiﬁed
by the variability of both cognitive AM performances (Levine et al.,
2002; Piolino et al., 2002; Piolino et al., 2006) and brain functions
(Colesetal.,2006).Thisapproachisparticularlysuitableforhealthy
middle-agedandelderlysubjects,whopresentgreaterintersubject
variability than young subjects (Piefke & Fink, 2005).
The aim of our neuroimaging study of healthy subjects was to
pinpoint the brain structures whose synaptic function subserves
the recollection of lifetime episodic AM, establishing correlations
between resting regional Cerebral Blood Flow (rCBF) measured
with PET and AM indexes regarding rich episodicity (i.e. the rec-
ollection of speciﬁc events with episodic details corresponding to
justiﬁedRememberresponses)andspontaneity(i.e.theretrievalof
memories without retrieval support) obtained separately using the
TEMPau task (Piolino et al., 2008). The results of 12 healthy middle-
aged subjects showed that the majority of memories involved a
ﬁeld perspective, gave rise to a sense of remembering which was
justiﬁed in terms of speciﬁcity and details, and were relatively
spontaneouslyretrieved,regardlessoftheirremoteness.Basedona
priori hypotheses regarding the involvement of the frontotemporal
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Cabeza & St Jacques, 2007; Conway et al., 2002), we ﬁrst extracted
the mean rCBF for each anatomical volume of interest selected
from a bilateral set of regions of interest covering the left and right
frontal and temporal lobes. Our paradigm gave us the opportu-
nity to single out two distinct aspects of AM retrieval, by recording
the generative processes (i.e. spontaneity index) and the recollec-
tion based on autonoetic consciousness with reliving of episodic
details (i.e. episodicity index). The main results indicated that the
rCBF values for the right hippocampus predicted the episodicity
index (unlike the index of semantization, based on Know mem-
ories) regardless of the content (but spatial>factual>temporal
details) and age of the memories, while that of the left medial
orbital frontal gyrus predicted the index of spontaneity, again for
every lifetime period. Second, a voxel-based analysis of the whole
brain using an exploratory approach conﬁrmed these striking rela-
tionships between episodic AM and rCBF in the medial temporal
regions, including the hippocampus, and between the spontaneity
of access to speciﬁc memories and rCBF in the frontal regions (see
Fig. 4A1 and A2). Other correlations for the episodicity index con-
cernedanetworkwhichbilaterallyencompassedthehippocampus,
parahippocampus,precuneus,lingualgyriandthalamus,regardless
of the period, with additional involvement of temporal and pre-
frontal neocortical regions for some of these periods. Concerning
the spontaneity index, the main correlations concerned the pre-
frontalcortexbilaterally,morespeciﬁcallytheorbitomedialsurface
(ventromedial part of Brodmann Area 10; medial parts of BA 11
and 47). Further SPM results (Fig. 5) showed that the ﬁeld perspec-
tive was mainly correlated with the right MTL (hippocampus and
parahippocampus) and lingual gyrus and left temporal pole, while
observer memories were mainly correlated with the left dorsolat-
eral and superior frontal gyri and bilateral posterior areas (cuneus
and occipital lobe).
Overall,theseﬁndingsforhealthysubjectsemphasizethenotion
that the hippocampus and neocortical regions are permanently
involved in episodic AM retrieval, regardless of remoteness. Right-
sided or bilateral involvement of the hippocampus characterizes
rich episodic AM recollection (see Section 4).
3.3. Neural substrates of the re-experiencing of episodic
autobiographical memory over time in brain-damaged patients
SomememorydiseaseshaveamassiveimpactonAM,especially
its episodic subcomponent (for reviews, see Conway & Fthenaki,
2000;Kopelman,2000;Kopelman&Kapur,2001).Studiesoflesions
in non-demented patients have emphasized the role of frontotem-
Fig. 4. SPM T-maps of signiﬁcant correlations between TEMPau scores and resting
brain measures (PET) for three lifetime periods. (adapted from Eustache et al., 2004
(B); Piolino, Chételat, Matuszewski, et al., 2007 (C); Piolino, Desgranges, Hubert,
et al., 2008 (A1 and A2))—(A1 and A2). Results in normal middle-aged subjects
for the correlation between cerebral blood ﬂow (CBF) and the episodicity (based
on autonoetic consciousness) and spontaneity indices (p<.005 uncorrected, cluster
size k>100)—(A1 and A2). Results in early to moderate Alzheimer’s disease (AD) for
correlation between FDG uptake and the AM index (p<.01 uncorrected, cluster size
k>80)—(B). Results in frontotemporal dementia (FTD) for correlation between FDG
uptake and the AM index (p<.005 uncorrected, cluster size k>100)-(C).
Fig. 5. SPM T-maps of signiﬁcant correlations between self-perspective in the TEMPau task and resting brain CBF measures (PET): ﬁeld (in the left) and observer (in the right)
viewpoints in healthy elderly subjects (p<.005 uncorrected, cluster size k>100).2322 P. Piolino et al. / Neuropsychologia 47 (2009) 2314–2329
Fig. 6. SPM T-maps showing the signiﬁcant hypometabolism found in Patient CL compared to normal controls (PET-FDG, p<0.001 uncorrected) projected in transverse
position and TEMPau CL’s performances (adapted from Piolino et al., 2005). Caption: Detailed scoring for each of the post-onset memories (no pre-onset memories) recalled
by CL in the TEMPau task (from the last12-month-period, and Christmas and summer 1997 from the last 5-year-period) using a ﬁne-grained 6 half-point episodic scale,
shown alongside controls’ results (mean rating scores), from the shortest interval (today) to the most distant interval tested, and CL’s subjective Remember, Know or Guess
responses accompanying each of his recollections. Data shown are the mean rating scores for controls from each question tested on the patient. CL’s raw scores are shown
with statistical signiﬁcance according to Z-scores (pathological score: **p<0.01; ***p<0.001).
poral areas in AM disruption, especially the right side (for reviews,
see Markowitsch, 1995; Kopelman, 2000). For example, Patient
ML (Levine et al., 1998) suffered from organic focal retrograde
amnesia after a head injury resulting in right-sided frontal dam-
age (BA 47) that involved the uncinate fasciculus and may have
disconnected the frontal and temporal structures. Using the TEM-
Pau task, the right prefrontal cortex was also found to be involved
in a case study of disproportionate retrograde amnesia (Piolino
et al., 2005). Patient CL manifested a sudden and persistent total
loss of personal identity in the context of clinically documented
goodeverydaymemoryandnormalneuroanatomicaldata(CTscan,
MRI). When compared with an age-matched control group, the
hypometabolism was found to be entirely restricted to the right
orbitofrontal cortex (BA 11/47, Fig. 6). CL’s state of mind was “a
blank” whenever he tried to think about his past. Even his post-
onset episodic AMs were fragile: he retained a subjective sense
of remembering for the last few days and weeks, but was unable
to recollect more distant personal events through mental time
travel,eventhosethatwereparticularlyself-relevant(e.g.his“ﬁrst”
Christmas).
The mechanisms by which episodic AM retrieval is disrupted
and their connection with the frontotemporal structures have
also been studied in demented patients with cortical dysfunction.
Our neuropsychological data revealed strongly contrasting proﬁles
of autobiographical retrograde amnesia according to the type of
dementia (Piolino, Desgranges, et al., 2003), in keeping with other
studies (e.g., Ivaniou et al., 2006; Nestor, Graham, Bozeat, Simons,
& Hodges, 2002). More speciﬁcally, in Alzheimer’s disease, which
preferentially affects the medial temporal lobe in the early stage of
dementia, we observed temporally graded memory deﬁcits obey-
ingRibot’sLaw,withremotememoriesbeingbetterpreservedthan
recent ones. Nevertheless, a ﬁne-grained analysis showed that rel-
atively preserved remote memories in Alzheimer’s disease were,
in fact, semanticized memories, with the result that episodic AM
had an entirely ﬂat gradient. In semantic dementia, characterized
by mainly external temporal lobe lesions with relative sparing of
the medial temporal lobe, our data revealed memory loss with a
reverse gradient. However, an assessment based on a sense of rec-
ollection (Remember responses) unconstrained by verbal abilities
broughttolightarelativepreservationofepisodicAMinearly-stage
semantic dementia, regardless of the lifetime period (see also Moss
et al., 2000; Piolino, Belliard, Desgranges, Perron, & Eustache, 2003;
Westmacott et al., 2001 for similar ﬁndings). Lastly, in the frontal
variant of frontotemporal dementia, results showed memory loss
without any clear temporal gradient (see also Matuszewski et al.,
2006). Episodic memories in their strictest deﬁnition (i.e., unique,
detailed, speciﬁc in time and space) were impaired, whatever the
time interval considered in the three groups, though memory loss
was global in Alzheimer’s disease and frontotemporal dementia,
and temporally graded in semantic dementia, sparing the most
recent period. These results demonstrate that autobiographical
amnesia varies according to the nature of the memories under con-
siderationandthelocusofcerebraldysfunction.Wehavediscussed
these proﬁles of autobiographical amnesia in the light of the two
competing models of long-term memory consolidation and recent
conceptions of autobiographical recollection (Piolino, Desgranges,
et al., 2003). Principally, the existence of a temporal gradient for
semanticized AM but total episodic retrograde amnesia (regardless
of the period) resulting from MTL damage in early Alzheimer’s dis-
ease supports the Multiple Trace Theory rather than the Standard
Theory.
Themainobjectiveinconductingaseriesofneuroimagingstud-
ies in neurodegenerative diseases was to further unravel the neural
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the type of dementia. We used the same approach as we had done
in the healthy elderly adults, looking for correlations between the
resting-state cerebral measure and temporally graded AM scores
in order to identify the brain structures whose synaptic dysfunc-
tion subserved the impairment. To this end, we studied a group
of 17 Alzheimer’s disease patients with mild to moderate demen-
tia (Eustache et al., 2004). We administered an abridged version of
the TEMPau task, assessing just three broad time periods (child-
hood and teenage years (0–17 years old), middle age (more than
30 years old) and the previous 5 years), and measured resting
cerebral metabolic rate of glucose using PET (resting normalized
ﬂuorodeoxyglucose uptake). The ﬁndings showed diverse corre-
lation patterns according to the time period being tested: the
correlations were restricted to the left middle frontal gyrus for
the teenage and childhood period, the bilateral prefrontal cortex
(bilateral superior, bilateral middle and right inferior gyri) for the
middle-ageperiod,andtherighthippocampusandrightfrontaland
temporal gyri for the last 5 years (see Fig. 4B). The data showed that
the hippocampus became disengaged from the retrieval of remote
AMs,whichbecamesemanticinsteadofepisodic.Theseﬁndingsare
consistent with both models of memory consolidation, in that the
latter share the notion of the temporary role of the hippocampus in
semanticizedmemories.Inthesamevein,theshiftfromrighttoleft
frontal regions as the time interval increases may reﬂect the move
awayfromanepisodicretrievalmodetowardsamoresemanticone
(see Hemispheric Encoding/Retrieval Asymnetry model, Tulving,
Kapur, Craik, Moscovitch, & Houle, 1994).
In order to examine the speciﬁcity of the neural bases of AM
impairments depending on the type of neurodegenerative disease,
we applied the same methodology, this time examining 5 lifetime
periods, to a group of 20 patients with frontotemporal demen-
tia (Piolino, Chételat, Matuszewski, et al., 2007). Behaviourally,
the frontotemporal dementia patients’ performances were rel-
atively similar to those of the Alzheimer’s disease patients, in
that they provided generic memories instead of event-speciﬁc
sensory–perceptual–affective details, but without the temporal
gradient, and displayed deﬁcits in the sense of reliving and
self-perspective during retrieval (i.e. providing more Know and
Observer responses). This pattern was very similar to that found
in a group of patients with traumatic brain injury, who manifested
deﬁcits in speciﬁcity, autonoetic consciousness and ﬁeld perspec-
tiveacrossallthelifetimeperiods(Piolino,Desgranges,Manning,et
al., 2007). The investigation of the mechanisms responsible for AM
deﬁcits in frontotemporal dementia related not only to executive
functions,asinourtraumaticbraininjurygroup,butalsotoseman-
ticverbalskills,asinsemanticdementiapatients(seeMatuszewski
et al., in press). The cognitive–metabolic correlations in frontotem-
poral dementia (Fig. 4C) revealed that the AM deﬁcits stemmed
mainly from the dysfunction of the left-sided orbitofrontal regions
(BA 11) and, to a lesser extent, that of the left-sided dorsolateral
(BA 6), frontal and temporal neocortical regions, whatever the time
period. Additional analysis showed that deﬁcits in speciﬁc mem-
ories were correlated with a dysfunction of the left orbitofrontal
areas, whereas the impaired production of generic memories was
correlated with a dysfunction of the left temporal pole.
We were therefore able to conﬁrm the existence of a speciﬁc
pattern of correlations in frontotemporal dementia compared with
Alzheimer’s disease, highlighting the effectiveness of the correla-
tive approach in shedding light on the mechanisms underpinning
different proﬁles of AM deﬁcits. More speciﬁcally, the mechanisms
of deﬁcits in Alzheimer’s disease (characterized by a temporal gra-
dient) were found to involve the hippocampus for recent AMs
(i.e. mainly anterograde memories) and the prefrontal cortex for
remote ones. By contrast, our ﬁndings support the view that AM
deﬁcits in frontotemporal dementia (characterized by a ﬂat gra-
dient) mainly stem from orbital prefrontal and lateral temporal
dysfunction, regardless of the time period. The pattern of correla-
tions therefore underlines the similarity of the mechanisms behind
deﬁcits in anterograde and retrograde memories in frontotemporal
dementia, unlike Alzheimer’s disease.
Overall, these studies yielded arguments in favour of the role of
the MTL, and more speciﬁcally the hippocampus, in the retrieval of
recent and remote episodic AMs, unlike the retrieval of semantic
AM, in keeping with the Multiple Trace Theory. We attempted to
ﬁnd further arguments for Multiple Trace Theory in non-demented
patients with focal lesions within the MTL. Neuropsychological
investigations designed to examine the extent of retrograde AM
deﬁcit in unilateral MTL lesions, be they single-case or group stud-
ies, have proved controversial, especially regarding episodic AM.
In collaboration with a research group specializing in epileptic
patients (Noulhiane, Piolino, Hasboun, Baulac, & Samson, 2007;
Noulhiane, Piolino, Hasboun, Baulac, & Samson, 2008), we carried
out a study of 22 patients who had undergone a left- (n=12) or
right-sided(n=10)MTLresectionforthereliefofepilepticseizures,
using a correlative approach based on the TEMPau and precise MRI
volumetric measures of the remaining tissue of the temporal lobe,
including different regions of the MTL (i.e. hippocampus, entorhi-
nal, perirhinal and parahippocampal cortices), temporopolar, and
the lateral temporal lobe (i.e. superior, middle and inferior tem-
poral gyri). Both patient groups displayed impaired episodic AM
retrieval across all time periods, compared with matched control
subjects, reﬂecting particular difﬁculty in producing speciﬁc and
detailedmemories,associatedwithpoorautonoeticconsciousness,
as revealed by the small number of justiﬁed Remember responses
acrossallperiods.Thisresultwasinkeepingwithsomeotherrecent
studies, which have shown that the famous Patient HM (Stein-
vorth et al., 2005) who underwent bilateral MTL removal to control
intractableepilepsy(Scoville&Milner,1957),andgroupsofpatients
with either right or left MTL damage (Viskontas, McAndrews, &
Moscovitch, 2000) were in fact equally deﬁcient in episodic AM
acrosstheirentirelifespan,withoutanytemporalgradient,whereas
personal semantic and generic memories were spared. That said,
we noticed that the patients with a right-sided resection had more
difﬁculty in recollecting episodic details from the reminiscence
bump period (18–30 years old), whereas the patients with the left-
sidedresectionexperiencedparticulardifﬁcultyregardingthemost
recent period. Analyses of correlations between MRI volume mea-
sures of temporal lobe structures and autobiographical memory
scores showed that there was no such correlation with the volumes
of the lateral temporal lobe structures, but revealed that right MTL
structures predicted episodic AM scores regardless of remoteness.
Therefore, these ﬁndings conﬁrmed the permanent role of MTL in
episodic AM retrieval in keeping with the Multiple Trace Theory.
3.4. Deﬁcits in the re-experiencing of episodic autobiographical
memory through time travel and the sense of self
As AM provides knowledge of one’s experiences across time,
enablingtheintegrationofpastandpresentselves,AMdeﬁcitspre-
dict a weakened sense of self (Bluck, 2003; Conway et al., 2004).
However, it can be noted in our AM studies that age-related deﬁcits
in AM fail to weaken self-coherence in healthy elderly partici-
pants (Duval, Eustache, & Piolino, 2007) as opposed to our patients
with psychiatric diseases such as depression (Lemogne et al., 2006)
and schizophrenia (Danion et al., 2005), and neurological diseases
such as Alzheimer’s Disease, or frontal lobe damage who present
severe retrograde amnesia with loss of self-identity. One of our
studies (Piolino et al., 2006) has provided further evidence that,
despite episodic AM deﬁcits in aging, the preservation of (a) per-
sonal semantic memory, which is a fundamental component of
personal identity (Conway et al., 2004; Tulving, 1993; Wilson &
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past,and(c)someepisodicmemories,enableshealthyolderpeople
to “travel back into their past”, thereby ensuring a sense of identity
and continuity in time.
We also observed that patients with frontal lobe damage or
medialtemporallobedamagehadaselectivedeﬁcitinepisodicAM,
with relative preservation of semantic AM, and an impoverished
ability to consciously recollect their past, even though they knew
about their past, giving a clear example of the distinction between
autonoetic remembering and noetic knowing. The reverse dissoci-
ation has been described in rare cases of patients with early-stage
semantic dementia, who lose some personal semantic knowledge
but are still able to recollect some episodic details (Piolino, Belliard,
et al., 2003). More generally, our patients with episodic AM disrup-
tion presented deﬁcits in speciﬁcity, autonoetic consciousness and
self-perspective, and were hampered in their ability to “travel back
in time”, relive speciﬁc events and view these events as they would
originally have been seen through their own eyes. Like Patient KC,
they still had a sense of personal identity, in that they could answer
the question “Who am I?”: they knew their name, those of fam-
ily, friends and colleagues, some general information such as that
given in a curriculum vitae, and also repeated personal events.
However,theywerefrequentlyunabletorecollecttheslightestspe-
ciﬁc personal event, even the most relevant and emotional ones.
Depending on the extent of the episodic AM disruption, their per-
sonal identity was more or less devoid of “intimacy”, which has
been regarded as one of the main phenomenological properties of
recollection since James (1890). With the progression of dementia
and the additional impairment of semantic AM, deﬁcits eventually
extended to a loss of conceptual self (see Addis & Tippet, 2004).
This observation is signiﬁcant at two levels: ﬁrst, it clearly con-
ﬁrms a dissociation in autobiographical memory between episodic
and semantic aspects, and secondly, it clearly demonstrates that
personal identity does not only involve conceptual self-knowledge
(Conway et al., 2004), but also relies on episodic attributes, such
as autonoetic consciousness, which allow individuals to remember
the past in an experiential way. Indeed, one of the main functions
of episodic AM is not only to adapt itself to the present but also to
maintain continuity of self in subjective time. It is the phenomeno-
logical self that gives us the ability to remember speciﬁc instances
which illustrate why and how we know who we are.
4. General discussion
We conducted a series of studies of episodic memory based on
a special method for assessing episodic AM across lifetime peri-
ods which placed the emphasis on the central attribute of episodic
memory, namely the autonoetic re-experiencing of past events
via subjective mental time travel. With regard to the neural sub-
strates of episodic AM over time, these studies broadly highlighted
the cerebral network that was recently identiﬁed in the review
by Cabeza & St Jacques (2007). More speciﬁcally, they clarify the
network’s role in different aspects of re-experiencing AM through
mental time travel and its links with other cognitive functions. We
begin by discussing the convergent evidence for the constructive
and dynamic nature of episodic AM over time, emphasizing the
role of prefrontal and external temporal regions. We then go on to
evoke the role of the MTL, and more especially the hippocampus,
in episodic AM retrieval, focusing on changes over time and the
phenomenological attributes.
4.1. The constructive and dynamic nature of episodic AM across
time
Our cognitive ﬁndings in children and elderly subjects and
our neuropsychological and neuroimaging ﬁndings clearly con-
ﬁrm that the episodic and semantic subcomponents of AM can
be dissociated, but are also closely linked, at both cognitive and
neural levels; they have common and unique processes. This is in
line with neuroimaging studies that have emphasized between-
systems similarities and within-system differences during episodic
memory and semantic memory (Burianova & Grady, 2007; Levine
et al., 2004; Nyberg, Forkstam, Petersson, Cabeza, & Ingvar, 2002).
More speciﬁcally, our developmental outcomes (in children and
elderly subjects alike) conﬁrm that episodic memory is a “late-
developing, and early-deteriorating past-oriented memory system,
more vulnerable than other memory systems to neuronal dysfunc-
tion” (Tulving, 2002,p .5 ) .
Furthermore, the study of the cognitive mechanisms behind
episodic AM disruption has provided evidence in support of
the multifaceted nature of episodic AM retrieval and con-
struction, which calls on multiple processes: gaining access
to sensory–perceptual–cognitive–affective speciﬁc details elicits
visual imagery and the autonoetic experience of mentally “reliv-
ing” a unique past event, and involves executive processes which
interact with personal semantic knowledge. Accordingly, the neu-
ropsychological data of patients with frontotemporal dementia
or semantic dementia clearly show that AM disruption stems
from a deﬁcit in the generative/construction processes that trig-
ger episodic AMs, processes which are closely linked to executive
andsemanticfunctionssubtendedbyfrontalandanteriortemporal
regions (Conway & Fthenaki, 2000; Conway et al., 2002).
Otherwise, neuroimaging studies of healthy subjects have
revealed that the recollection of episodic AMs associated with a
sense of remembering requires retrieval processes that are reliant
on the prefrontal cortex and lateral temporal lobe for generative
and semantic processes, but also on the medial temporal lobe for
recollection (autonoesis, emotion, self-perspective), and parieto-
occipital regions such as the cuneus/precuneus for mental visual
imagery. The data suggest that episodic AMs are triggered in the
prefrontal cortex and generated through information stored in net-
works located near the posterior brain via the hippocampus, which
plays a special role in recollecting and binding all the multifaceted
attributesofepisodicAM(e.g.images,feelings,seebelow).Thisisin
keeping with neuropsychological studies that have shown that AM
is disrupted by frontal and/or temporal lobe lesions (see Conway
& Fthenaki, 2000; Kopelman & Kapur, 2001; Markowitsch, 1995,
for reviews), by more posterior lesions (Greenberg & Rubin, 2003)
or by their disconnection (Levine et al., 1998; Piolino et al., 2005).
At the cognitive level, breakdowns in executive function, but also in
episodicandsemanticmemory,canplayamajorroleinepisodicAM
disruption, as comprehensively illustrated by the contrasting pat-
terns of autobiographical amnesia in the three neurodegenerative
diseases we explored.
We also found that speciﬁcity, the subjective sense of remem-
bering and the original ﬁeld perspective, all of which are deemed
to be critical features of episodic memory, are prone to fading and
decay over time. However, even if the semantization of episodic
memories over time does indeed occur, some lifelong episodic
AMs resist this trend. At the neural level, we found that seman-
ticized AMs ceased to depend upon the MTL (i.e. in studies of
healthy subjects and Alzheimer’s disease patients), while episodic
AMs remain under the inﬂuence of the MTL and MTL-neocortical
links. Of particular interest, we noted the presence of external
temporal lobe activation or correlation, clearly demonstrating the
increasing role of semantic processes in episodic AM retrieval over
time and, more generally, the dynamic relationships between both
subcomponents of AM. For example, the 18–30 years old period,
which concerns the reminiscence bump, containing vivid and self-
relevant phenomenological episodic memories, was characterized
by the additional involvement of the right superior temporal pole
and superior/middle temporal gyrus. This period includes events
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ticularly well-remembered by subjects over 40 years old and are
relatively well-protected from the deleterious effects of time and
age (Piolino et al., 2002; Piolino et al., 2006). Hence, this result
stressestheroleofsemanticknowledgeinaccessingepisodicmem-
ories from the reminiscence bump which are particularly critical to
one’ssenseofidentity(Conway&Pleydell-Pearce,2000;Fitzgerald,
1996).Leavingasidethereminiscencebump,thetemporalpoleand
lateral temporal regions correlated with MTL regions and episodic
re-experiencing during the retrieval of recent and remote periods
alike. The role of both external temporal regions in episodic AM
is consistent with the fact that lesions to the temporopolar region
may cause focal retrograde autobiographical amnesia (Wheeler &
McMillan, 2001) as this region is deemed to act as a convergence
zone, binding information from the hippocampal structures and
posterior association regions (Damasio, 1989; Markowitsch, 1995).
Moreover, there is evidence to link the functions of the lateral
temporal lobes and temporal pole to personal semantic memory
processes (for a review, see Svoboda et al., 2006). Lastly, we were
able to demonstrate that the percentage of generic memories pro-
videdbyfrontotemporaldementiapatientswascorrelatedwiththe
metabolism of the left temporal pole. Overall, our ﬁndings sub-
stantiate the notion that executive and both episodic and semantic
memory processes are integral parts of episodic AM recollection,
because of their special role they play in constructing an AM trace
(Conway et al., 2002; Levine et al., 2004; Svoboda et al., 2006).
Therefore, episodic AM studies make it possible to look at
episodicmemoryrepresentationsandprocessesfromamuchmore
dynamic perspective than the recall of stimuli presented in the
laboratory. Several studies have demonstrated that the conscious
recollection of autobiographical events involves common but also
unique processes compared with this kind of recall (Nyberg et al.,
2002; Burianova and Grady, 2007). Our studies were speciﬁcally
designed to enlight the evolution and reorganization of personal
experiences over the course of time and to unravel the complex
mechanisms of episodic AM retrieval pinpointing the role of the
frontal and medial temporal structures in these mechanisms.
4.2. The role of left prefrontal regions in episodic AM retrieval
Asfarastheroleoftheprefrontalcortexandexecutivefunctions
in episodic AM retrieval deﬁcits is concerned, our neuropsycholog-
ical and neuroimaging examinations of frontotemporal dementia
and traumatic brain injury patients (as well as normal elderly
subjects) provide rigorous convergent evidence, regardless of the
lifetime period. This is in line with the literature on autobiograph-
ical amnesia in patients with focal lesions to the frontal lobe and
theﬁndingsofneuroimagingstudiesofnormalsubjects,whichhave
shown that the frontal lobe plays a crucial role in episodic mem-
oryandautonoeticconsciousness(Wheeler&Stuss,2003;Wheeler
et al., 1997). These data are not only consistent with the role of
the prefrontal cortex in self-referential processes, but also with its
roleasaworking-with-memorystructurethatisinvolvedinstrate-
gic aspects of retrieval, such as establishing a retrieval mode and
goals, initiating and guiding search, and monitoring and verifying
the memories that have been retrieved (for reviews, see Cabeza &
St Jacques, 2007; Gilboa, 2004).
Our ﬁndings conﬁrm the constant left-sided recruitment of the
prefrontal cortex in AM retrieval, even concerning its episodic
subcomponent, which contrasts with the right-sided involvement
in episodic memory highlighted by laboratory paradigms. Gilboa
(2004) has demonstrated that the activation of the right prefrontal
cortex (BA 9/46/10) is rarely observed in AM studies, as opposed to
episodic memory studies based on laboratory paradigms. Labora-
toryactivationstudiesofhealthysubjectshaveshownthattheright
prefrontal cortex subtends the retrieval of episodic information
(regardlessofitsverbalorvisuospatialnature),whereastheleftpre-
frontal cortex subtends the retrieval of semantic information (see
HemisphericEncoding/RetrievalAsymmetrymodel,Habib,Nyberg,
& Tulving, 2003; Tulving et al., 1994). Several interpretations have
been proposed for this preferentially left-sided prefrontal cortex
activation observed in AM studies (for a review, see Cabeza & St
Jacques, 2007; Gilboa, 2004), but we adhere to the view that it may
depend on the nature of generative AM retrieval, which relies on
both executive and semantic processes, even when vivid episodic
AMs are triggered (Conway et al., 2002). This is well in agreement
withtheresultsofNybergandhiscollaboratorsdemonstratingthat
AM retrieval, semantic memory and working memory overlap in
left prefrontal cortex (Nyberg et al., 2003).
Our results stressed the involvement of different parts of the
left prefrontal cortex which may reﬂect the intervention of dis-
tinct processes (see Badre & Wagner, 2004; Christoff & Gabrieli,
2000; Petrides, 2000). While our activation studies have mainly
established the existence of left dorsolateral prefrontal activation,
our correlational studies of healthy subjects and frontotemporal
dementia patients have pinpointed the critical role of the left orbit-
omedial prefrontal cortex (BA 11/47) and, to a lesser extent, that
of the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (BA 6/45). Our ﬁndings
regarding the left dorsolateral cortex are consistent with its sec-
ondary involvement in AM reconstruction (Svoboda et al., 2006),
and suggest that this region is mobilized when high demands are
placed on monitoring processes for certain time periods (e.g. the
most remote one). As regards the orbitomedial (or ventromedial)
prefrontal cortex, this is one of the most ubiquitous activation sites
in AM neuroimaging studies. In fact, although both orbital and dor-
solateral areas are associated with executive functions (Cabeza &
Nyberg, 2000; Collette & Van der Linden, 2002), the role of the left
orbitofrontal cortex seems to be more crucial in autobiographical
retrieval (Gilboa, 2004; Svoboda et al., 2006). This could be due
to its involvement in behavioural regulation, emotion or inhibi-
tion processing and, of particular relevance here, in the generative
retrieval processes activated in the TEMPau task. Our AM task
probably prompts the assessment of internally generated informa-
tion and a number of self-referential processes (i.e. representation,
monitoring, assessment and integration of material of a personally
relevant nature, Cabeza & St Jacques, 2007; Northoff & Bermpohl,
2004), and these mainly involve this prefrontal region. Moreover,
Brodmannareas11and47arecloselyconnectedtothelimbicstruc-
tures (Wheeler & Stuss, 2003), this connection being crucial to
episodic AM retrieval (i.e. access attempts and recollection). There-
fore,wesuggestthatthemajorinvolvementoftheleftorbitomedial
prefrontal cortex in the TEMPau task reﬂects the critical role of
self-referential representation in AM strategic retrieval processes.
Nevertheless, supplementary analyses (based on connectiv-
ity or correlation methods and on hypometabolism in one case
study)performedinbothtypesofneuroimagingstudiesindicateda
more bilateral involvement of the prefrontal cortex in episodic AM
retrieval. This right-hemispheric prefrontal cortex involvement ﬁts
in better with the functional role of this region observed in the
episodic memory retrieval task (Desgranges et al., 1998; Tulving
et al., 1994). In particular, the right orbitomedial prefrontal cortex
matches one of the three right prefrontal cortical sites shown to be
involvednotonlyintheestablishmentandmaintenanceofepisodic
memoryinthe“retrievalmode”(Lepage,Ghaffar,Nyberg,&Tulving,
2000), but also in the adoption of self-perspective when remem-
bering past episodes (Northoff & Bermpohl, 2004) and in affect-
laden autobiographical memory (Markowitsch, Vandekerckhove,
Lanfermann, & Russ, 2003). However, an increasing number of acti-
vationstudieshavedetectedbilateralprefrontalrecruitmentduring
episodic AM (Greenberg et al., 2005), possibly due to the use of
longer retrieval times (approximately 20s). Based on electrophysi-
ologicalﬁndings,Conwayetal.(2002)suggestedthatleftprefrontal
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tiation processes, whereas right prefrontal activations arise later,
along with those of the temporal and posterior regions, when a
memory is held in mind, and reﬂect access to episodic details via
autobiographical knowledge (i.e. personal semantics), as well as
re-experiencing via autonoetic consciousness.
4.3. The permanent role of the medial temporal lobe in the
recollection of episodic autobiographical memories
The close concordance between our neuropsychological and
functional neuroimaging (activation or correlations) data has
highlighted the involvement of the MTL—and more precisely the
hippocampus—in episodic AM across time. Using strict criteria
for controlling the episodic features of AM, and avoiding certain
methodological biases prevalent in neuroimaging studies, our
present results demonstrate that the recollection of episodic mem-
ories is dependent upon the hippocampus whatever their age,
unlike that of semanticized memories (i.e. memories of generic
eventsormemoriesassociatedwithKnowresponses).Importantly,
episodic AMs are characterized by spatiotemporal speciﬁcity, but
also by autonoetic consciousness, visual imagery and emotion, all
of which are critical features of episodic memory. We therefore
emphasize that hippocampal involvement is not only related to the
speciﬁcityofmemories,butalsotothesenseof“mentaltimetravel”
and phenomenological re-experiencing (Tulving, 2002; Wheeler et
al., 1997). Our studies conﬁrm previous ﬁndings that have revealed
not only a common memory retrieval network supporting all AM
types, but also unique regions dedicated to either episodic or
semantic AM (Levine et al., 2004; Maguire & Mummery, 1999),
supporting a functional neuroanatomical dissociation between
episodic and semantic autobiographical memory. The critical
role of the hippocampus in autonoetic consciousness may seem
surprising, given that autonoetic re-experiencing is regarded as a
function that is most likely to be subserved by the frontal lobes.
Nonetheless, this involvement is in keeping with several studies
suggesting that MTL structures, notably the hippocampus, do
indeed play a part in this phenomenon (Moscovitch et al., 2005;
Tulving & Markowitsch, 1998).
The involvement of the hippocampus in episodic AM retrieval
whatever the lifetime period argues against the Standard Theory
of consolidation and instead supports the Multiple Trace The-
ory, which states that the MTL is involved in the mechanism that
reactivates all the neocortical regions where the multifaceted com-
ponents of episodic memories are represented, regardless of the
passage of time (see Section 1). Further strong arguments are
additionally provided, as we underline the permanent nature of
the connectivity between the MTL and neocortex (more speciﬁ-
cally the temporal region) in healthy subjects, both for remote and
recent episodic AMs, as predicted by the Multiple Trace Theory
(Moscovitchetal.,2005;Nadel,Winocur,Ryan,&Moscovitch,2007;
Nadel, Campbell, et al., 2007). However, our results also show, and
conﬁrm, that memory remoteness is not the only factor inﬂuencing
brain MTL activity, as the phenomenological features of episodic
AM retrieval are also crucial for the continuous involvement of
MTL-neocortical connectivity over time (see also Moscovitch et
al., 2005). For example, we found that remote or recent periods
which were richer in phenomenal qualities prompted bilateral hip-
pocampalactivation,whereasremoteorrecentperiodswhichwere
episodic in terms of speciﬁcity and details but with a lower level
of re-experiencing and phenomenological features gave rise to
left hippocampal activation instead. Further arguments are pro-
vided, showing that the various phenomenological attributes of
episodic AMs, such as re-experiencing and mental visual imagery
(i.e., retrieval strategy used, number of images, ﬁeld point of
view), are predictive of hippocampal involvement (both in activa-
tion and correlation studies), chieﬂy right-sided. Like Piefke et al.
(2003),wefoundthatpositiveemotionalattributespredictedbilat-
eral hippocampal activation. In the same vein, we also observed
that within-MTL connectivity (hippocampus, parahippocampus
and amygdala) and MTL-neocortical connectivity was greater for
richly recollected episodic AMs, regardless of their remoteness, in
line with the recent study of Nadel, Campbell, et al. (2007) which
showed that hippocampal–neocortical activation is not inﬂuenced
by the passage of time (but by multiple retrievals of AM). Lastly,
we demonstrated that recollected factual, spatial and temporal
elements of speciﬁc AMs (Remember responses justiﬁed by the
recollection of contextual details) were connected to right-sided
hippocampal activity. As far as the correlation studies are con-
cerned, the pivotal role of the right hippocampus can be explained
by the fact that we used a special episodic AM task designed to
promptthere-experiencingassociatedwithAMretrieval,aswellas
by the other AM qualities accompanying this re-experiencing. Our
overall results suggest that the bilateral or right hippocampus con-
tributes to the successful retrieval of episodic memories, which is
largely dependent upon the richness of the phenomenological and
spatiotemporal details that are re-experienced, above and beyond
their speciﬁcity. Recollection was therefore found to be an impor-
tant determinant of hippocampal activation in terms of the ability
to re-experience events and the other AM qualities associated with
re-experiencing, such as detail, emotionality, visual imagery and
personal signiﬁcance, all these features being described as impor-
tant characteristics of episodic AMs, contributing to autonoetic
consciousness.
Finally, the issue of hippocampal laterality in AM remains the
subject of much debate. In keeping with our lesion study in epilep-
tic patients, Gilboa et al. (2005), unlike Kopelman et al. (2003),
found a signiﬁcant correlation in patients with AD between remote
AM and the amount of remaining tissue in bilateral MTL. This
correlation was stronger on the right than on the left, while per-
sonal semantic memory was mainly related to a pattern of bilateral
anterior and posterior lateral temporal cortex decline, which was
more pronounced on the left. We also reported a link between
right MTL glucose metabolism in AD patients and recent episodic
AMs (unlike semanticized remote AMs). Regarding our activa-
tion studies, the results differ from most neuroimaging studies of
AM, which have reported the constant involvement of the hip-
pocampus, preferentially left-lateralized like the prefrontal cortex
(Maguire, 2001). Some studies have suggested that a more bilat-
eral network may be activated in frontal and medial temporal
regions during episodic AM retrieval, depending on the recency
of memories (Maguire & Frith, 2003b), as well as the age of the
subjects (for a review, see Piefke & Fink, 2005) and the presence
of amnesia (Maguire, Vargha-Khadem, & Mishkin, 2001). A reduc-
tion in hemispheric asymmetry (see the Hemispheric Asymmetry
Reduction in OLDder adults model of ageing effects, Cabeza, 2002)
could account for the bilateral involvement of the hippocampus,
suggesting in turn the existence of compensatory processes. How-
ever, our results are in keeping with recent data revealing that
the re-experiencing of recollected memories and the qualities of
these memories may inﬂuence hippocampal engagement indepen-
dently of factors such as remoteness and age. For example, some
activationstudieshavedetectedbilateralorrighthippocampalacti-
vation when subjects, regardless of their age, become engaged in
the retrieval of speciﬁc autobiographical memories rated highly in
terms of mental imagery, richness of detail, emotionality, reexpe-
riencing or personal signiﬁcance (Addis, Moscovitch, Crawley, &
McAndrews, 2004; Daselaar et al., 2008; Greenberg et al., 2005;
Markowitsch et al., 2000; Piefke et al., 2003; Steinvorth, Corkin, &
Halgren, 2006). Overall ﬁndings suggest that, above and beyond
the speciﬁcity of memories which may be sustained by the left
hippocampus, the phenomenological qualities of memories may
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In summary, the ﬁndings of our activation and correlation
studies of healthy subjects and our neuropsychological and neu-
roimagingstudiesofepilepticpatientsstresstheroleofthebilateral
or right MTL in the recollection of rich recent and remote episodic
AMs. Interestingly, however, they indicate that the Multiple Trace
Theory (and more generally models of memory consolidation)
could be supplemented and possibly strengthened by a more
accurate consideration of the way in which the MTL-neocortical
interaction is modulated by the phenomenal features of memo-
ries that are retrieved, such as re-experiencing, emotion and self
perspective, or frequency of AM retrievals (see Nadel, Winocur, et
al., 2007; Nadel, Campbell, et al., 2007). As stressed recently by
Moscovitch (2008), the exact role of hippocampus regarding the
complex reconstructive processes in episodic memory over the
course of time is one of the key challenges of current cognitive
neuroscience.
In conclusion, as Tulving (2002) explains, “people can have
mental access to their personal past not only in terms of auto-
noetic remembering but also in terms of nonautonoetic knowing”
(p. 7). By developing a paradigm speciﬁcally designed to assess
the three prerequisites of episodic autobiographical memories –
self, autonoetic consciousness and subjectively sensed time – we
have shown that knowing develops before remembering in chil-
dren and that remembering is more susceptible to deterioration
over time and with age, as well as in most patients with cerebral
lesions,withdifferentproﬁlescorrespondingtodifferentsituations.
Our present data, based on neuropsychological and neuroimag-
ing studies, highlight the importance of the phenomenological self
in maintaining a sense of continuity in subjective time, and of
the prefrontal lobe in implementing self-related retrieval strate-
gies and hippocampus in re-experiencing the past regardless of its
remoteness. At the cognitive and neural level, they also reveal the
complexityoftheconstructiveanddynamicnatureofepisodicAMs
over time.
The study of episodic AMs conﬁrms that episodic memory is
“really a marvel of nature” (Tulving, 2002, p. 19), and the rich-
ness of these episodic AMs will undoubtedly prove particularly
useful for honing the concept of episodic memory still further.
As Endel Tulving has written, “It took biological evolution a long
time to build a time machine in the brain, and it has managed
to do it only once, but the consequences have been enormous:
by virtue of their mental control over time, human beings now
wield powers on Earth that in many ways rival or even exceed
those of nature itself. It is difﬁcult to imagine a marvel of nature
greater than that.” (Tulving, 2002, p. 20). Another vital task will
be to continue making the study of AM (and its two compo-
nents, i.e. episodic memory and semantic memory) a more integral
part of models of human memory (Eustache & Desgranges, 2008;
Piolino, Desgranges, & Eustache, 2008). Last but not least, it will
be particularly rewarding to continue our cognitive and neural
exploration of the interactions between autobiographical mem-
ory and working memory (Baddeley, 2000), perceptual memory
(Gagnepain, Lebreton, Desgranges, & Eustache, 2008), and proce-
dural memory (Beaunieux et al., 2006). A truly exciting prospect
indeed!
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